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ABSTRACT 
During the next three years the video game industry will be challenged by the transition 
to a new generation of game consoles. The increased development costs associated with an order 
of magnitude leap in console performance is the game developer's main concern. As retail prices 
of console games will not increase, the implication is a shakeout of smaller game companies. 
However, during the transition period other gaming platforms will gain market share from the 
consoles, offering new opportunities for companies positioned to exploit them. 
The changing landscape will require game developers such as Radical Games to revise 
their strategies, as Radical's traditional competitive advantages will be eroded by the transition. 
Radical should diversify from its primary focus on consoles and explore the emerging niche 
opportunities, using the transition as an opportunity to develop its own Intellectual Property in a 
low-cost, low-risk manner. 
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1 PROJECTOVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Industry overview 
From its beginnings in 1971, the video game industry has grown into a significant part of 
the entertainment industry. In 2002, combined video game hardware and software spending in 
the United States was $10.2 billion (Pachter I I). For comparison, movie box office receipts in 
the United States for 2002 were $9.5 billion, book sales were $10.1 billion, while music sales 
were $12.5 billion and movie rentals and sales for home use totalled $20 billion (Pachter 11-12). 
The video game industry is also growing faster than the other sectors of the entertainment 
industry. Globally, the video game software market was $22.3 billion in 2003. By 2008, the 
world video game market is expected to grow to $55.6 billion, a compound annual growth rate of 
18.7% (PricewaterhouseCoopers 323). In comparison, book and music sales are expected to grow 
at only 5% annually and movie receipts at 7-9% during the same time period (Pachter 12). 
1.1.2 Hardware 
Video games are created for a variety of hardware platforms including consoles, 
handheld systems, personal computers and cell phones. A console is a dedicated computer 
hardware system designed exclusively for the purpose of playing video games. Consoles consist 
of an AC-powered central unit containing the processor(s) and disc or cartridge interface, joystick 
controllers, and a television output port. The current console market leader is Sony's Playstation 
2, followed by Microsoft's Xbox and Nintendo's GameCube (The Economist 2003). Worldwide, 
console games accounted for 62% of game software revenues in 2003 (Pachter 2004). Consoles 
are expected to remain the dominant gaming platform for the next few years (Pachter 13). 
Handheld systems are simply small, portable consoles with a built-in display screen. 
They run on battery power. Nintendo currently dominates this market; its Gameboy series of 
portable devices has a worldwide installed base of 143 million units in 2003 (Pachter 2004). 
Personal computers and cell phones are not designed as game playing devices, and 
therefore have some limitations. Cell phones suffer from a small screen, limited memory, low 
processing power, poor graphics ability and a difficult user interface. They are widely popular, 
however, and present an established delivery channel for accessing new garners. From the 
developer's perspective, PCs are a difficult platform due to the wide and unpredictable range of 
end-user configurations available. PC games are also easily pirated. However, due to their 
internet connectivity, PCs are the platform of choice for various forms of online gaming, a sector 
that is expected to grow significantly in the next few years (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2004). 
1.1.3 Console transition 
Consoles are and will remain the dominant gaming platform for the next few years 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2004). Consoles have a lifespan of five to six years between successive 
hardware iterations (Games Investor Consulting 2004). For example, the release dates for Sony's 
Playstation series of game consoles are 1995,2000 and 2006 (Console Database 2004). The 
console life cycle is characterised by 4 years of growth and one year of change over, causing 
cyclical trends in the industry during transitions from one generation to the next (Games Investor 
Consulting). In general, the transition during the last year of one console's lifecycle and the first 
year of the next are the low points for the industry as consumers stop making purchases for the 
old hardware in anticipation of the new, while the new hardware has not yet gained critical mass. 
The next transition period will happen between 2005 and 2007. It will be challenging 
for developers since game prices are expected to remain stable while development costs will 
increase by at least a factor of two (Wolverton 2004). This will be caused by the increased 
complexity of the systems and the additional content that will be required for next generation 
games (Hermida 28 Aug. 2004). Since developers cannot pass these costs on to the consumer in 
the form of higher prices they must find ways to improve their efficiency. If they cannot do that, 
they will be forced out of the market. They may also wish to diversify into other platforms such 
as handheld systems and cell phones, but these have smaller markets, lower retail prices and 
lower barriers to entry. 
1.1.4 Market 
The traditional video game consumer market was the teenage male, but this demographic 
is changing, as video games become a more socially acceptable form of entertainment. 
According to the Entertainment Software Association's figures for 2003, the average age of a 
video game player is now 29, with 39% of game players being female. Only 38% of game 
players are under 18, while 40% are 18-35 and another 22% are over 35 (Entertainment Software 
Association 2004). Much of the projected growth in game sales for the next few years is 
expected to come from growth in the market segments of female gamers, older adults and casual 
gamers (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2004). The overall trend is for a broader spectrum of the 
population to buy and play games in the future. 
On the supply side, the industry is split into hardware manufacturers and software 
providers. Software is subdivided into development and publishing. Hardware manufacturers 
create consoles and handheld gaming systems. Developers create game software for publishers, 
while publishers market and sell the finished product to consumers. There are three major 
hardware manufacturers (Sony, Microsoft, Nintendo), 75 publishers and 1000 development 
companies in the industry (Michael 2004). 
Publishers dominate the industry, with the top 10 owning 74% of the 2003 software 
market (Nouzareth 2004). Each of these publishers maintains an internal game development 
capability, and in addition publishes games created by third party development companies. Each 
of the hardware manufacturers is also one of these top 10 publishers, producing and marketing 
games for its respective hardware system(s). 
The video game industry is a hit-driven business, as only a handful of games make a 
profit for developers (Gurwin 2004). With an average console game costing $7 million to 
develop (Gurwin 2004), publishers are averse to funding projects that cannot be predicted to 
become sure winners. This has caused an industry-wide trend favouring games based on licensed 
Intellectual Property (IP), franchises and sequels. Publishers are relying more on internal 
development to reduce costs and increase control over a product, putting further pressure on third 
party game developers. 
1.1.5 Radical Games 
Radical Games is a mid-sized video game developer located in Vancouver BC. 
Established in 1991 as a privately owned company, Radical has grown to over 200 employees, 
split into five production teams. Radical's size makes it one of the ten largest pure game 
developers in the industry. Radical specialises in creating driving and adventure games based on 
licensed IP. Its primary market is North America with a secondary market in Europe. It develops 
both console and PC games under contract with external publishers. Its business model is to fund 
product development with an advance on royalties, then to profit from any royalties earned 
beyond a game's break-even sales point (Michael 2004). 
1.2 Scope and methodology 
1.2.1 Scope 
This paper was written to determine a transition strategy for Radical Games. As a pure 
developer dependent on contract work for survival, Radical will be adversely affected by the cost 
increases associated with the console transition. Radical is in a difficult position since it occupies 
the disappearing middle ground of game development: Historically, Radical has not been able to 
obtain the top IP licenses from publishers; this IP will become critical during the transition period 
as publishers retract their funding for less profitable IP and focus on hit properties. While it is 
larger than most development studios, it does not have the financial resources to weather the 
transition without changing, but its overhead prevents it from competing on price with smaller, 
leaner studios. 
1.2.2 Methodology 
Background data was obtained from a number of professional industry reports. These 
provide both historical and future predictions of market size, installed base and price trends. 
Additional information on the transition and its effects on the industry was obtained from a 
variety of game industry sources, news pieces and journal articles. Information on Radical Games 
was obtained through personal interviews with the management team. 
2 EXTERNAL ANALYSIS: THE VIDEO GAME 
INDUSTRY 
2.1 Industry overview 
2.1.1 Size and composition 
The video game industry is composed of hardware manufacturers, game developers, 
publishers, distributors and retailers. Worldwide, there are three major console manufacturers 
and 75 game publishers. There are 1000 game development companies in North America and 
Europe, and the same number again in Asia. In North America, there are 5 major retail chains 
providing distribution to the end consumer (Michael 2004). 
2.1.2 Value chain 
The video game value chain consists of the following components: 
Figure 1 The video game value chain 
(Brest 2001) 
Developer 
2.1.2.1 Developers 
Developers create games under a contractual arrangement with a publisher, usually an 
advance on royalties. They do not sell directly to the end consumer. Radical is in this category. 
Hardware 
maker 
3 Publisher 3 Distributor 3 Retailer 3 Consumer 
Developers create games for a publisher for an advance on royalties. If the game is successful, 
the developer receives further royalty payments. There are about 1000 small development studios 
in North America that work on this model. Developers far outnumber publishers, and as they 
lack financial resources and ownership of Intellectual Property (IP), they have very little market 
power. The most common exit strategy for a developer is to be acquired by a publisher. 
2.1.2.2 Publishers 
Publishers are the real owners of the value chain as they are responsible for bringing the 
game from the developer to the end consumer. Publishers provide both the marketing and 
delivery of finished games. Games reach the end consumer through retail channels, third party 
distribution or direct distribution. Publishers acquire games in a number of ways; through 
internal development, distribution arrangements with third party developers, and by contracting 
out game development work. The publishing segment functions as an oligopoly with the top 10 
of 75 publishers owning 74% of the market, as shown by the following table: 
Table 1 Major game publishers ranked by sales revenue 
Publisher 
Electronic Arts 
2003 Software Market Share 
22.12% 
Nintendo 
Atari 
9.13% 
6.45% 
THQ 
Activision 
Sony 
6.42% 
6.06% 
5.73% 
Vivendi Universal 
Take 2 Interactive 
I Total 1 74% 
(Nouzareth 2004) 
5.47% 
4.79% 
Microsoft 
Ubisoft 
Publishers mostly engage in monopolistic competition, competing on feature sets and 
licensed IP, although there are occasional price wars to gain market share. In 2004, price 
4.02% 
3.81% 
reductions for Sega's ESPN Sports vs. EA Sports provides an example of recent price-based 
competition. 
In North America, there are almost 1000 development studios competing for contracts 
with the major publishers. The majority of development studios are small, consisting of only a 
single development team or even just a few individuals. Less than a dozen have reached and 
sustained Radical's size (Michael 2004). 
The major publishers all have internal teams to capture more of the value chain. Large 
publishers have the marketing budgets and retail agreements that can push a game to hit status. 
Major publishers are often the only way to gain access to the big retailers. Publishers need small 
developers for three reasons: to access a skill set they lack internally, to pick up extra projects 
they cannot afford to produce in house, and to 'buy' innovation. Small development houses have 
a reputation for being more innovative than large publishers. 
There are three types of publisher, as determined by the origin of their products. An 
exclusive publisher publishes only internally developed titles. Take Two Interactive (creator of 
the Grand The$ Auto series) is the largest company in this segment. A publisher/developer both 
develops games internally and publishes games made by third parties in exchange for a royalty. 
Electronic Arts is the largest publisher in this category. A pure publisher does not develop any 
games internally, acting instead as a middleman for third party developers. This model is no 
longer attractive due to the cost benefits of internal development. 
2.1.2.3 Hardware makers 
The major console manufacturers are Sony, Microsoft and Nintendo. Each of these 
companies also develops games internally and publishes third party software for its respective 
hardware platform. Hardware manufacturers follow a razorlblade model, losing money on the 
hardware but making up for it in software sales. Hardware makers collect a royalty on every unit 
of software sold for their systems. 
Table 2 2004 Installed console base in North America & Europe 
Console 
Sony Playstation 2 
I I 
(Pachter 2004) 
Installed base 
55.6 Million 
Microsoft Xbox 
Nintendo GameCube 
For this generation, Sony's Playstation 2 is the clear winner in hardware sales, outselling 
the other two platforms by a ratio of 3 to 1. 
16.7 Million 
13.7 Million 
2.1.2.4 Distributors 
Distributors act as middlemen, buying games in bulk from publishers and redistributing 
them to smaller retailers. Third party distributors are diminishing in importance as most of the 
big publishers have integrated forward to perform their own distribution functions. Third party 
distribution currently accounts for only 30% of games shipped, down from 50% 10 years ago 
(Pachter 8-9). 
2.1.2.5 Retailers 
The majority of video games are sold as packaged goods in retail outlets. The top 5 
retailers own 75% of the retail market for video games (Conley 2004). Retailers have significant 
market power as the physical size of their shelf space limits the number of titles they can display. 
Small developers with unknown products cannot get shelf space without the backing of a large 
publisher. When allocating shelf space, retailers have found that they can achieve higher sales by 
displaying multiple copies of a hit title rather than individual copies of lesser-known titles. The 
major retailers are listed below: 
Table 3 Market share of major game retailers 
I Retailer 1 2003 Market Share I 
Wal-Mart 
Best Buv 
1 Tovs R Us 1 10% 
19% 
17% 
Game Stop 
Electronics Boutique 
( Total 1 75% 
(Conley 2004) 
15% 
14% 
2.1.3 Economics 
The games industry is a hit-driven business, as only the top 5% of video games are truly 
profitable (the majority will break even with a small built-in profit margin). Up front 
development costs are similar regardless of a game's sales potential, but since marginal costs 
decrease as unit volume increases, the economics favour hit titles. The great majority of 
successful games include a combination of licensed IP, sequels and franchises (Hyman 2004). In 
contrast, only a minority of games based on original content achieve hit status (the first of the 
Grand Theft Auto series). In 2003,9 of the top 10 console games in North America were sequels, 
while the remaining entry (Enter the Matrix) was a franchise based on a movie license (NPD 
Funworld 2003). 
2.1.3.1 Profit margins 
The following table shows a per-unit breakdown of the costs associated with publishing a 
console video game. While these are representative numbers and may vary for any specific title, 
the table is useful to create an understanding of the cost distribution for video game production. 
Table 4 Sample publisher profit margin breakdown 
Price Component 
Wholesale to publisher 1 $40 
Cost 
Retail price 
Retailer  ort ti on 
$50 
$10 
Distributor cost 
Manufacture/packaging 
Developer royalty o r  internal team cost ( $5 
$0 - $3 
$3 
Hardware royalty 
Licensed IP rovaltv 
$8 
$0 - $10 
Working from the table, it is easy to calculate the effect of an increase to development 
costs. If other costs are held constant and development costs doubled to $10 per unit, the 
publisher's gross margin would drop by 58% to $7 per unit. Note that the publisher's internal 
overhead costs must still be deducted before computing its final profit. 
Marketing expense 
Publisher gross margin 
2.1.3.2 Fixed costs 
The above table presents costs on a per-unit basis, assuming a break-even situation. In 
reality, a number of these costs are fixed and must be paid up front regardless of final unit sales. 
Development costs, marketing expenses, and some portion of distribution, cost of goods and IP 
license fees are all incurred before the first sale is made. For an average video game, these 
combined costs can range from $5 million to $15 million dollars (Taub 2003). 
$0 - $10 
$12 average 
2.1.3.3 Marginal cost 
Once a game breaks even, marginal costs are all variable; cost of goods, distribution and 
royalty payments are all made on a per-unit basis. This improves the publisher's margins to an 
average of $18 per unit, a 50% increase over the break-even situation. If the game was developed 
internally, the publisher also recaptures the ongoing $5 per unit developer royalty, improving its 
margins even further. 
(Pachter 2004) (Swartz 2004) 
2.1.3.4 Implication 
The high fixed costs associated with producing a video game underscore the hit-driven 
nature of the business. Any game that fails to recover its development costs is an expensive loss 
to the publisher. Conversely, a game whose sales exceed its break-even point has a high profit 
margin. As development costs increase, sales must also increase in order to preserve the 
publisher's margin. The implication of the fixed-to-variable cost structure is that publishers will 
attempt to mitigate risk by betting on sure hits rather than risky titles. 
2.1.4 Trends 
A major consolidation of publishers and development studios is underway, a trend that is 
expected to increase during the transition period (Kirby 2002). The major publishers are 
integrating backwards along the value chain by creating or acquiring internal teams, leaving less 
work for third party developers. The overall result will be fewer, larger publishers and fewer 
independent developers remaining in the next few years. The rate of consolidation is expected to 
increase during the next console transition as development costs increase to double their current 
levels. This will raise the cost of failure, forcing publishers to create guaranteed hit titles or face 
bankruptcy. This pressure will be transferred to developers in the form of fewer contracts and 
competition for lower rates. However, there will still be a place in the market for independent 
development studios as sources of innovation (Hermida 30 Aug. 2003). 
2.2 The console transition 
2.2.1 Timeline 
The next generation consoles are expected to launch between 2005 and 2006 (Hermida 6 
Sept. 2004). They will initially be expensive with a small installed base, few games, and will 
present development challenges as game makers learn the new technology. However, once the 
transition period passes, consoles will remain the largest market segment. 
Table 5 Next generation console launch dates 
Console 
Sonv Plavstation 3 
(Games Investor Consulting 2004) 
Release date 
0 4  2006 
Microsoft Xenon 
Nintendo Revolution 
In comparison, the current generation of consoles is expected to continue to sell for at 
Q3 2005 
0 2  2006 
least the first half and possibly for the entire next generation life cycle (Mercer 2003). This is 
more likely to be the case for the Playstation 2 than for the other two consoles as it has the 
greatest level of developer support. The current systems are relatively cheap, with continuing 
price cuts to the hardware, a large installed base, lots of games and lower development costs, 
balanced by a shrinking market and lower price points for games. 
Table 6 Current generation consoles 
I Console 1 Release date I US Installed Base (07104) 1 I Sony Playstation 2 ( Q4 2000 1 24.4M 
(Games Investor Consulting) (Pachter) 
Previous console transitions occurred from 1995 to 1996 and again from 2000 to 2001. 
The first of these was revolutionary in nature, a shift from 2D to 3D gaming. It was characterized 
by the rapid die-off of the incumbent 2D consoles and the rapid uptake of the new 3D-capable 
consoles. Developers experienced many technical challenges as programmers and artists were 
forced to master and entirely new skill set. The previous transition was evolutionary, an upgrade 
to a more powerful version of the 3D-capable consoles. In that transition, the challenge was not 
so much one of technology but of learning how to manage development projects with much larger 
team sizes and budgets than ever before. 
Microsoft Xbox I Q4 200 1 
Nintendo Gamecube 1 0 4  2001 
This time, the challenge is to remain profitable in an environment with increased 
development costs and fixed retail costs. The current systems are estimated to be only halfway 
9.4M 
7.7M 
through their sales lifespan (Becker 2004), meaning that two generations of consoles will exist in 
parallel throughout the next generation's lifecycle. Since the existing consoles still have a lot of 
mileage left, it is expected that consumers will be slow to abandon them and slow to adopt the 
next generation systems (Mercer 2003). The result will be a slow smooth transition between 
generations, forcing developers to continue supporting the old systems as their market shrinks 
while simultaneously investing in the new systems despite their small initial installed base. This 
happened on a much smaller scale during the previous transition in which the Playstation 1 
continued to sell throughout the life of the Playstation 2. Many developers abandoned it too early 
in its lifecycle and paid an opportunity cost for doing so. 
The following presents a summary of the challenges and differences of the three most 
recent console transitions: 
1995,2D to 3D transition. This transition was mostly a technical challenge as 
developers were forced to learn an entirely new skill set. Game teams also 
increased dramatically in size to accommodate the increased requirements of 3D 
games. 
2000, an evolutionary transition. This transition featured more and better 3D 
graphics with an accompanying increase in budgets and team size. The main 
challenge during this transition was the successful management of increased 
project sizes. 
2005-2006, discontinuous transition. In this transition will bring a content 
explosion accompanied by a freeze in retail prices. The challenge this time will 
be to reduce costs and increase sales in order to remain profitable. 
2.2.2 Hardware 
This section contains a description of the next generation of video game platforms. 
2.2.2.1 Consoles 
Sony, Microsoft and Nintendo are all expected to release new game consoles during the 
next two years (Wolverton 2004). At the time of this writing, there is no publicly available hard 
data regarding next generation console specifications. In general, however, we can expect new 
consoles to be a minimum of 10 times more powerful than the current generation in terms of 
processing power - a quick Moore's Law calculation provides the basic multiple (3+ doubling 
periods from the last generation) (Lee 2004). In reality, a much greater jump is possible from the 
use of multiple processors and more specialization within the graphics hardware, especially the 
vector units and shaders (hardware used for advanced graphics processing). The Playstation 3 
may have up to 100 times more processing power than the Playstation 2 due to its networked 
CPU architecture (Becker 2004). Overall improvements in system memory and disc-based 
storage will not be so dramatic except for the Playstation 3's Blu-Ray DVD, which will have 12 
times the capacity of a normal DVD (Kallender 2004). 
2.2.2.2 Handheld systems 
The next generation of handheld systems will provide the power of a full-sized current 
generation game console in a portable package. As Microsoft does not have an entry in the 
handheld market, the competition is between Sony and Nintendo. Nintendo's system has an 
advantage over Sony's in that it can play games from any of the Gameboy series of handheld 
devices, of which there are over 100 million worldwide (Pachter 2004). However, no winner has 
been predicted. The two systems may even co-exist in different market segments (Associated 
Press 2004). 
These systems will be launched during the bridge period between the current and next 
generation game consoles, helping to smooth that transition even more. Handheld systems 
feature mid-range pricing compared to the consoles, small markets during the first year and few 
new games, although the backwards-compatible Nintendo DS will play any of the existing 
Gameboy titles. It is likely that both devices will initially be sold at a loss to gain market 
penetration. This generation of handheld players has similar 3D capabilities to the existing 
consoles. The implication is that current console games can be ported to the handheld for low 
cost to rapidly build a games library. Electronic Arts has already done this for the Nintendo DS 
with Madden and Tiger Woods (Associated Press 2004). 
Table 7 Next generation handheld gaming platforms 
I Handheld I Release Date I Launch Price I First year sales I 
(Associated Press) (Pachter) 
Sony Playstation Portable 
Nintendo Dual Screen 
2.2.2.3 Wireless 
During the next few years, cell phone gaming is expected to grow from a relatively 
insignificant $158 million in 2004 to $3.2 billion in 2007, an 82% compound annual growth rate 
(Pricewaterhousecoopers 2004). The prediction is that this growth will be driven by increased 
handset capabilities and by increased wireless bandwith. Cell phone game revenues will be 
derived from a combination of a subscription model, micro-payments and added content for other 
game platforms. Cell phones are not the ideal gaming platform due to their small size, limited 
input interface and small screens, but they are popular with the mass market and are the most 
convergent consumer electronics device available today (Slagle 2004). 
2.2.2.4 Online 
The term 'online gaming' covers several distinct types of games: Pure online, in the form 
of games downloaded and played over the internet, multiplayer online, featuring small groups of 
players connecting via the internet, and massively multiplayer online, where thousands of players 
interact in a persistent game world. 
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Pure online games are played on PCs and cell phones. Multiplayer games are played on 
PCs, cell phones and increasingly on consoles. Massively multiplayer games are entirely PC- 
based. Massively multiplayer online games (MMO) are predicted to be the biggest growth 
segment, although this is mostly in Asia (Pricewaterhousecoopers 2004). The MMO market has 
existed for a few years in North America and has yet to be profitable for more than a handful of 
companies. Multiplayer online gaming is growing in popularity, but consumers are used to 
playing these games for free; in this case the online component is merely a sales driver for the 
retail product. In the console space, Microsoft is successfully charging a yearly fee for its Xbox 
Live service. Sony's competing service is still free to consumers and is being used as a marketing 
tool to build up a subscriber base. 
Broadband penetration rates during the transition period will increase to well over 80% in 
Canada, lower in the US, which is currently mostly using dial up access (Web Site Optimization 
2004). This is a prerequisite for online gaming to enter the mass market. Increased broadband 
adoption will also affect the potential for digital content distribution and online console gaming. 
2.2.3 Challenges 
Technically, the next generation poses a number of development challenges that will in 
turn affect the costs of game production. At the same time, the transition period imposes an 
additional requirement of multiple platform support in order to smooth revenues, with the further 
complication that much of this investment will be wasted on platforms that will fail to become 
dominant. 
2.2.3.1 Cost and time 
Next generation technologies will result in increased game development budgets. Note 
that in the video game industry, costs refer almost entirely to salary costs. Game producers like 
Electronic Arts estimate that next generation console games will take 2-3 times as many person- 
months to develop due to needs for increased content, quality and complexity (Wolverton 2004). 
In addition to the direct costs of larger teams, a developer's costs will also increase as they build 
or buy these new tool sets and pipelines, especially those used to generate more art assets. A 
developer may need to add new programmer skill sets, especially for animation, artificial 
intelligence, physics, and online game play. Other hidden costs include longer pre-production 
times and the need to switch to a more formal production model as the 'on the fly' development 
methodology will no longer be viable. 
Companies like Radical currently take two years to develop a game (Michael 2004). As 
the entire console lifecycle is only five years long, developers cannot afford to double their 
production times, so instead they will have to double the number of team members on each 
project. This means choosing between making fewer games at a company's existing size, or a 
doubling the number of employees. Larger companies have an advantage in that they can 
leverage assets from other teams to reduce the total production time required. Success at this 
strategy will depend on a set of common tools, base art, and game engines that can be re- 
purposed to suit multiple games. 
2.2.3.2 Complexity and content 
Consumer expectations will rise with to meet the performance of the system. For the next 
generation, consumers will expect greatly improved graphics, larger game worlds, and a greater 
level of detail and numbers of objects within a world. Consumers will also expect a both greater 
range of interactivity in the world and an assortment of online options for next generation games. 
The increasing complexity requirements with each new hardware generation are partially the fault 
of the industry. Game consoles and their games have been marketed for years on the strength of 
system power and graphics performance (Herrnida 30 Aug. 2003). This is what drives the 
hardcore garners to buy and leads to the mass-market adoption of a game. Professional game 
reviewers also place a heavy emphasis on the technology used by a game. 
2.2.3.3 Shrinking margins 
Retail prices are expected to remain fixed at $50 for a premium title (GameDaily Biz 
2004), with the possibility of a maximum increase of $5 US for a next generation game (Pachter 
2004). As development costs increase, publisher profit margins will shrink. 
Radical currently charges about $5 million to develop a game (Michael 2004). At its 
current cost levels this translates into 1 million units sold in order to earn out its advance on 
royalties. If development costs double for the next generation, 2 million units of sales will be 
required to earn out the publisher's advance. Failing that, the publisher will be forced to absorb 
the extra development costs from its profit margin. Once development costs double, the publisher 
has few options: it can reduce its risk by betting only on hit titles, by reducing the rates it gives to 
its developers, or by finding cheaper outsourcing alternatives. Being a premium-priced 
developer, Radical could be forced out of the market by this situation. 
2.2.3.4 Emerging distribution channels 
Digital distribution allows developers to bypass the traditional publishing and retail 
channels and capture more of the value chain in the process. Two barriers to digital distribution 
have been both a lack of broadband access and consumer hesitation to purchase a purely digital 
product that could easily be corrupted or destroyed (Hyman 2004). However, it is expected that 
digital sales will continue to grow in the future, although they will not seriously challenge the 
retail channel during the next console generation (pricewaterhousecoopers 2004). 
A few companies are experimenting with pure digital distribution while others are trying 
out a combination of both retail and digital channels, with different a different profit split between 
the developer and publisher for each method. Valve Software, creator of the best-selling Half-life 
2 game has been extremely successful using this model (BBC News UK edition 2004), and other 
companies can be expected to follow suit. One variation of this method is to provide 
downloadable games through an online subscription service like those offered by telecom 
companies. This method does not generate a lot of revenue, but does increase a title's exposure 
and can be a driver of retail sales. However, regardless of the distribution method used, games 
will still need marketing budgets to get the consumer's attention, and at the moment, the 
publishers provide this money. 
2.2.4 Consolidation 
The major driver of consolidation in the next generation is the combination of increased 
development costs and fixed retail prices (Herrnida 6 Sept. 2004). This will squeeze publisher 
margins, forcing them to release fewer games and to take fewer risks by betting only on hit titles. 
As developers will be forced to compete among themselves to offer lower prices to the 
publishers, many will be driven out of the industry. Some of these developers will choose to 
migrate instead to the smaller, less profitable emerging market segments, filling up an already 
crowded market. 
A second problem is that two generations of consoles will exist simultaneously during the 
transition; one with expensive development costs and a small installed base, the other with lower 
development costs, but numerous competitors and a shrinking market. Developers will likely 
have to deliver products on multiple platforms to ride out the transition. This will put an 
additional strain on their internal resources. 
With limited resources, small developers commonly adopt a strategy of supporting only 
the top two platforms in an given category. This support in turn creates a network effect that 
further strengthens the position of the leading platforms. During a transition, developers are 
forced to guess as to which consoles will end up being dominant and risk wasting resources on an 
eventual loser. Sony's Playstation 2 is the clear winner of the current generation, but while Xbox 
is currently leading the GameCube in installed base, picking the second most popular console 
from these two entrants was not easy at the beginning of the cycle. Since a system's installed 
base and support for backwards compatibility seem to be important elements in determining its 
future success, it is likely that the Playstation 3 and Xbox 2 will become the dominant next 
generation consoles, while Nintendo DS and Sony PSP and will emerge as the dominant handheld 
devices. With respect to online console gaming, the outcome is undecided between Sony and 
Xbox Live at the moment. Sony has a larger online presence, but earns no revenue, while 
Microsoft has successfully charged a subscription fee for a smaller customer base. 
2.3 The consumer market 
The intent of this section is to analyse the video game market in terms of sales, platforms 
and regions to determine the best market segments for Radical to pursue. Radical's traditional 
strategy has been to target the largest market segments by platform (Michael 2004). 
2.3.1 World market 
Worldwide, the market for video game software is predicted to grow from $24.6B to 
$55.6B from 2004 to 2008, a compound annual growth rate of 20.1% (Pricewaterhousecoopers 
2004). Growth is predicted across all platforms with the exception of PC game sales, which are 
expected to remain flat or decrease slightly (Pricewaterhousecoopers 2004). 
It should be noted that a shift in platform rankings is expected to accompany the coming 
console transition, as shown by the tables below: 
Table 8 2004 market share by region and platform 
region ( platform I $(millions USD) I market share 
North America I PC 1388 1 5.7% 1 
North America I console 
Asia 
Europe 
Asia 
6406 1 26.1% 
console 
console 
PC 
Asia 
Europe 
North America 
Asia 
Europe 
Europe 
Table 9 2008 market share by region and platform 
6052 
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(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2004) 
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In the current generation, consoles clearly dominate with a combined share of 66% of the 
1020 
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(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2004) 
market. In the next generation, the console share will drop to 40.4%, while both online and 
4.2% 
3.9% 
3.6% 
3.4% 
548 
408 
wireless gaming in Asia will surpass Europe's console contribution. In addition, PC games will 
2.2% 
1.7% 
fall to last place across all regions (Pricewaterhousecoopers 2004). This suggests that a shift in 
target markets and platforms will be required for the transition. Note that Radical currently 
targets North America and Europe with console and PC games. 
2.3.2 North American market 
Radical's primary market is North America for console and PC games, and is expected to 
remain so in the future (Michael 2004). In 2003, sales of console and PC games in North 
America totalled $7.6 billion, and are projected to reach $9.9 billion in 2008 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 325, 344). From a platform perspective, the largest market segment 
was software for the Playstation2, which has an installed base of 25 million consoles in North 
America. The following table shows North American game software sales for the transition 
period. Consoles are expected to remain the dominant platform during the transition period. PC 
games are expected to decline as handheld, online and wireless gaming increase. 
Table 10 North American game software sales (millions USD) 
Console 
Total 1 8342 1 9011 1 10132 1 12168 1 15145 1 16888 1 100.1 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 325, 344) 
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1344 
566 
158 
up to half of PC sales for some of its games. In 2003, sales of console and PC games in Europe 
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331). Consoles will remain the dominant market segment, but will be in much closer 
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competition with online and wireless gaming than in North America. The European will also 
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grow faster than its counterpart in North America, approaching 83% of its size by 2008. 
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Table 11 European game software sales (millions USD) 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 33 1) 
2.3.4 Ignoring Asia 
In the coming years, the Asian market will grow in size, both in console penetration and 
in online and wireless gaming. At first glance, this would seem to be a logical area for expansion. 
However, this market has traditionally been out of reach for most North American developers due 
to cultural differences in consumer tastes (Wakabayashi 2004). This is expected to remain the 
case for the near future. Radical has not had past success in this market and does not expect to be 
able to exploit it in the future due to cultural differences (Michael 2004). This leaves the North 
American and European console markets as the two largest segments for Radical to exploit during 
the transition period. 
2.3.5 Market share by platform 
Market share for the various gaming platforms will change as follows during the 
transition period: 
Figure 2 2004 world market share per platform 
wireless 
1 
I 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 325, 331, 336, 341, 344) 
Figure 3 2008 world market share per platform 
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(PricewaterhouseCoopers 325, 331, 336, 341, 344) 
2.3.6 Demographics 
Overall, the demographic trend for the next few years is for an increase in the age of 
game players from teentyoung adult to younglmature adult. Female representation is expected to 
increase, as is the proportion of casual to hardcose gamers (PricewaterhouseCoopess 322). The 
implication of this is that game content must be adjusted to match changes in the customer base. 
In the past, Radical has concentrated on making Teen rated games with a cartoon flavour, but has 
recently expanded its product line-up to include Mature rated titles like Scurfrrce and C.S.I. 
(Entertainment Software Ratings Board 2004). 
2.3.7 Game genres 
Video games are classified by their genre, a term that describes the central theme around 
which the game format is based. Popular genres include sports, action, racing, role playing, 
shooting, simulation and fighting. Developers tend to specialize in one or two genres and will 
compete with other developers within that category. In 2003, almost three quarters of console 
games fell into one of four popular genres, as shown in the chart below: 
Figure 4 Video game market share by genre 
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(Rocsearch 2004) 
Radical currently focuses o n  the driving and actionladventure segments, which combined 
account for  44% of the potential market. 
2.3.8 Top market segments 
Since Asia is not practically accessible, Radical's top two segments for the next 
generation will remain North American and European console games, targeted at teens and 
mature audiences and appealing to both hardcore and casual garners. 
2.4 Five forces framework 
This section will apply Porter's Five Forces Framework (Johnson 112-120) to Radical 
Games. The model will be applied in the context of a game developer providing its services to a 
publisher. 
2.4.1 Buyers 
In this version of the model, the buyers are the game publishers who contract for 
development services. Buyers are publishers. As previously discussed, buyers have a high 
degree of power which will increase during the transition as fewer publishers remain and those 
that do will reduce the number and riskiness of the projects they undertake. As contracts dry up, 
publishers will have their pick of developers, allowing them to squeeze the developers. An 
additional source of power is the publishers' own internal teams. Switching costs for buyers are 
low between projects, although there are some costs if a supplier is switched during a project. 
Buyers have alternate sources of supply in the form of internal teams, outsourcing or specialized 
development houses. 
2.4.2 Suppliers 
Suppliers represent both the talent pool of artists and programmers who could potentially 
become Radical employees and development companies who could perform subcontracting work 
for Radical. Suppliers have low power now, and this will be even lower in the future as 
development studios go out of business. This will allow existing developers to find better talent 
for lower costs. There is some concern for Radical in this area due to the presence of EA in the 
same city competing for the best people. Switching costs to Radical are low. Suppliers can band 
together to form their own development companies however, which will have lower costs and 
compete with Radical for contracts. 
2.4.3 Potential entrants 
Potential entrants are any other development companies that can compete with Radical 
for publishing contracts. There are some barriers to entry into this space, the largest being the 
need for a track record to gain the confidence of a publisher. However, once trust is established, 
the barrier to entry is very low - the publisher pays the costs. There are some economies of scale 
that Radical has achieved with the ability to shuffle resource between projects. As more 
companies go out of business, more of their developers will form start ups. As the experienced 
members of these new companies will already have relationships with publishers, they will be 
able to compete against Radical for contracts. 
2.4.4 Substitutes 
Substitutes are any other methods a publisher could use to acquire a video game. This 
would primarily mean an internal team, but also includes outsourcing options or the use of 
specialized development firms. Publishers will be increasingly tempted to create internal teams 
to recapture the lost royalties paid to external teams. This can be good for Radical (in the form of 
a buyout) or very bad as the publisher's internal teams compete directly for contracts. Substitutes 
also include outsourced art or specialty houses, all of which can reduce total contracts or contract 
sizes. 
2.4.5 Competitive rivalry 
Competitive rivalry refers to the competition for publishing contracts among the various 
game development companies. Rivalry is intense in the games industry. During the transition, 
competitors will be fighting for a reduced number of contracts. Exit barriers are low however, so 
many will choose to exit once they become unprofitable. Radical may or may not have the cash 
reserves necessary to weather the transition. However, due to its size, Radical has extra capacity 
that smaller single-team competitors do not; this provides a buffer against the failure of a single 
contract . 
INTERNAL ANALYSIS: RADICAL GAMES 
3.1 Company overview 
The information in this section was gathered from Radical's website and from personal 
interviews with the company CEO and with the VP of Business Development (Michael 2004) 
(Radical Games 2004) (Wilkinson 2004). 
3.1.1 Background and culture 
Radical Games is a privately owned video game development company. It has been in 
business for 13 years, having been established in 1991. It is a mid-sized company, consisting of 
about 200 employees split into five development teams and a central tools group. It is one of 
only 10 pure development studios that has reached this size. Its three best selling titles are the 
Hulk action game ( 2  million units sold), the Simpsons Hit & Run, and Simpsons Road Rage 
driving games (each over 3 million units sold). Radical has developed games for a number of 
publishers in the past, but currently has an exclusive multi-game development deal with Vivendi 
Universal Games. It takes Radical approximately two years and $5 million to develop a game. 
Some of its internal challenges include obtaining strong IP licenses, limited revenues, and high 
research and development costs. Radical tends to be expensive relative to smaller developers, 
preferring to develop premium content in exchange for higher contract rates. 
3.1.2 Organization 
Radical consists of about 200 employees, split into 5 production teams and a 
technology/tools group. A central management team directs the activities of the studio and 
explores opportunities for business development. At the next level, each game production team 
functions as a separate business unit with its own budget and development staff. A team is run by 
a producer who is responsible both for the business and management aspects of the team. 
3.1.3 Business model 
Radical provides contracted game development services to game publishers. It funds 
most of its development through a non-refundable advance on royalties provided by a publisher. 
Radical builds a small profit into the non-refundable portion of the contract. Once a game 
reaches its break-even point, Radical earns additional royalties in the range of 10% of gross 
revenues. As its built-in profit margin is small, any real profits it earns must come from the 
above-average performance of a title in the marketplace. These profits must then be used to 
protect against underperforming titles and to invest in new technologies, limiting the company's 
opportunity for growth. 
3.1.4 Marketing strategy 
Radical develops content based on licensed IP that has the potential for strong sales. 
Radical does not compete on price; it charges publishers a premium price for a premium product 
and will not negotiate for lower contract rates just to secure a deal. When competing for 
contracts, Radical focuses both on its tangible track record, and on its intangible reputation for 
treating IP with respect and for 'doing it justice' in a gaming environment. In tandem with this, 
Radical selects its contracts carefully and has an excellent record of obtaining the contracts it 
wants. 
The company has traditionally focused on creating games with a fun, cartoon flavour. In 
the past, its games were targeted teenage and young adult males, the Hulk and Simpsons games 
being rated Teen, for example. However, market forces have required it to recently expand its 
demographic to include an older audience. Two of its more recent games (C.S.I. and Scarface) are 
both rated Mature. Radical still focuses on the large male gaming demographic, although there is 
some crossover appeal to female gamers for both the Simpsons titles and C.S.I. 
Radical is mainly a console developer. It develops mostly for the Playstation 2 and Xbox 
consoles, but also releases ports for the GameCube and standalone products for the PC. It is 
currently investigating both the next generation consoles and the new Sony PSP and Nintendo DS 
handheld devices as possibilities for the future. Radical is also exploring alternate platforms such 
as cell phones and online gaming in emerging markets. 
3.2 SWOT analysis 
This section will analyse Radical's capabilities in the framework of a traditional SWOT 
analysis. 
3.2.1 Strengths 
Experience track record, reputation for quality 
Economy of scale due to its size; can shuffle resources among production teeams. 
Access to desirable IP through its publishing partners. Reputation for 'doiing 
justice' to past IP helps secure new contracts. 
Long-term game development contract with Vivendi Universal Games protects it 
from instability. Option to be acquired is a viable exit strategy. 
Proprietary game engine, pipeline tools reduce dependency on outside parties. 
Prototyping tools enhance ability to gain contracts. 
3.2.2 Weaknesses 
Games are based on licensed IP. Ongoing search for suitable IP is one of the 
company' s biggest challenges. 
High overhead means higher development costs than a small studio. Must 
convince publishers of quality to avoid competing on price. 
Multiple teams means a need for a steady stream of development contracts to 
keep everyone employed. 
Skill set is limited to consoles and PC development; it has no experience making 
handheld, cell phone or online games, all of which are growth areas for the 
future. 
Long development cycle (two years on average) limits the number of 
simultaneous projects it can undertake. 
Production teams are treated as separate business units, causing difficulties with 
under-utilised resources during non-peak periods of the development cycle. 
Limited career ladder. Employees may have to leave the company if they wish to 
grow past a certain level of achievement. 
Competition for talent with Electronic Arts and others. This will intensify during 
the transition. 
3.2.3 Opportunities 
Leverage track record and exclusive relationship with Vivendi to secure better IP. 
This leads to larger contracts, improved royalty rates, greater profits. 
Diversify into other platforms and game genres, made possible by the size of the 
studio and the ability to leverage employee downtime during production cycles. 
Explore a self-publishing option through online distribution. 
Reduce development costs through outsourcing, subcontracting. 
3.2.4 Threats 
Combination of leaner, cheaper development studios, continuing backwards 
integration by publishers and outsourcing trends. 
Increased competition for premium IP licenses. 
4 STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES 
4.1 Background 
4.1.1 The problem: fixed retail prices 
Multiple sources indicate that the retail price of games will stay fixed at current levels or 
will increase at most by $5 (Wolverton 2004) (Pachter 2004) (Hermida 6 Sept. 2004). Long term 
trends indicate a continued reduction in retail prices over the next generation lifecycle (Pachter 
2004). 
4.1.2 The key variables: cost and sales 
The overall next generation challenge can be summarized in terms of two variables: cost 
and sales. Game publishers will be under pressure to find a winning combination of lower costs 
and higher sales. To remain competitive as a contract developer, Radical must find a way to 
compete on one or both of these dimensions. 
4.1.2.1 The costltime relationship 
Cost is a direct function of the number of person-hours required to make a game. 
Because the console life cycle is only 5 years long, developers cannot afford to double their 
development times. Radical's current development cycle is two years long. As they cannot 
afford four-year development cycles, they will have to increase the size of their development 
teams, either by increasing their staff or reducing the number of games they produce. Doubling 
in size will be especially difficult given their proximity to Electronic Arts, a studio four times as 
large that will also be competing for local talent. 
4.1.3 Cost reduction strategies 
As previously discussed, next generation development will be expensive primarily due to 
an increase in labour-intensive content requirements; more detail per object and more objects per 
world will require more staff to complete the game in a given time frame. Most of this increase 
will involve the art side, but some code-intensive features like physics, interaction rules and A1 
will affect the programming side as well. To lower costs, Radical will need to develop a process 
to create bigger, visually richer and more complex games more efficiently than they do today. 
4.1.3.1 Sharing assets across products 
The first option to accomplish this is to leverage code, art and tools across multiple titles: 
use a standardized tool set across games, share assets, outsource/contract assets to a cheaper 
studio and re-purpose game engines and libraries for multiple titles. Most of the programming 
challenges, the physics, interaction and graphics requirements can be solved through rniddleware, 
but the purchase cost has to be weighed against in-house development. 
4.1.3.2 Reducing content requirements 
A second option is to reduce the total game content without reducing the perceived value 
to the user. This means creating shorter games or episodic content while retaining the 'per level' 
quality of a full-sized game. The cost benefit here is that games can be created with a derivation 
of a real options strategy. Initially, only the pilot episode needs to be created for release to the 
market. The remaining content would only be developed after the market has responded 
positively. This strategy protects the developer and publisher against the risk of sinking high 
development costs into a product that will ultimately fail. 
4.1.3.3 Outsourcing 
A third option is to subcontract some of the labour-intensive work to cheaper 
development houses, whether in North America, China or India. Radical has already had some 
past success outsourcing art creation to China, and may be able to build on this for the future. 
This option would require Radical to develop the templates and process for game-critical art so 
that the outsourcing partner could then mass-produce it for them. 
4.1.4 Sales improvement strategies 
Given that development costs will be higher, publishers will need to sell more units of a 
title in order to preserve their margins. There are a number of ways to do this: 
4.1.4.1 More attractive IP 
Radical is a stable, established company with a history of quality titles that sell well. 
Radical may be able to negotiate for better licenses from its publisher once the transition occurs 
since there will be fewer developers remaining to compete for them. Outside this relationship, 
there are two problems with securing quality IP - trust (how will you treat the IP?) and the cost of 
the license. As licensing costs increase, the publisher must be satisfied that the title will sell 
enough units to recover the additional cost. Part of the sales equation is determined by the 
developer's ability to deliver a game of sufficient quality, on time and on budget. 
4.1.4.2 New market segments 
Radical can tap an under serviced market by altering its content and marketing strategy to 
appeal to women and casual garners. Radical currently makes games in only two genres - driving 
and actiodadventure. This option would mean a shift away from the action titles, but their 
expertise with driving games could be leveraged to make more exploration-type games. Digital 
distribution may also play a part in this strategy by providing a channel to people who don't 
normally shop at video game stores. 
The hurdle with reaching new markets is the need for the customer to purchase a console 
first - a sizable investment for a casual or new gamer. New demographics, episodic and 
differently themed content would probably work better on a PC or cell phone, which almost 
everyone has access to. The better strategy is to reach new market segments within the 
established video game demographic - Radical's move to Mature rated games is an example of 
this. 
4.1.4.3 Differentiated pricing 
Episodic content is essentially an unbundling strategy that produces differentiated pricing 
for different market segments. The hardcore gaming segment can be expected to buy a full 
bundled set of episodes for the full price, while casual garners will buy only as many episodes as 
they are willing to pay for. This strategy will increase overall sales by reaching a wider market 
than the current all-or-none approach. 
4.2 Strategic options 
4.2.1 Status quo 
This option proposes that Radical continue to support the Playstation 2 and Xbox 
platforms until they are no longer viable. 
This is the easy and obvious choice, but it has some problems and risks associated with it. 
First is the shrinking market for PS2 and Xbox software, combined with the uncertainty that no 
one knows just how quickly it will decline. The 2D to 3D console transition showed a steep 
decline, while the 2" generation transition was much more gradual; the PSOne (Playstation 2's 
predecessor) is still selling a small number of units even today. Industry experts predict that 
Playstation 2 and Xbox will continue to sell for a few years after the introduction of next 
generation consoles, based on a comparison of the PSOne lifecycle to hardware price reductions. 
However, the implication of focusing only on the current generation means that no competencies 
will be developed for the next generation machines. When it is finally time to switch platforms, 
Radical will be at least one game iteration behind its competitors in terms of skills and technical 
quality. 
Another issue is backwards compatibility. Since the new machines are expected to be 
backwards compatible with games for the current systems, customers will be tempted to purchase 
a new console with new games and play their existing games library on it. New releases for 
current generation consoles will then be competing with a huge library of existing titles. 
4.2.2 Hybrid 
This option proposes that Radical split its development resources to support some 
combination of the current and next generation consoles and handheld devices: Playstation 2, 
Xbox, PSP, DS, Playstation 3 and Xbox 2. 
This is Radical's current plan. They intend to diversify into all of the existing big- 
revenue platforms and adjust as the market chooses the winners. The major problem with this 
strategy is obtaining enough resources to cover all of the bases. There is also the issue of wasting 
resources on an eventual loser. Competencies for handheld and next generation don't yet exist 
within the company but are easier to develop than other options since they are evolutionary from 
the existing skill base. 
Porting games from one platform to another is the most likely way to achieve this 
strategy. Radical would develop primarily for the likeliest market leader (Playstation 3) and port 
iback to the other systems. The risks are a lack of original content for the other platforms, and the 
trade-off between the cost of multiple platform support versus the increased market size such 
support would bring. Porting games will help to amortize the increased development costs for the 
Playstation 3 as the porting process is much quicker and cheaper than the original development. 
This will provide access to a larger market for low additional expense. One issue that remains is 
the question of whether back-porting from the Playstation 3 will really be a simple matter. 
Radical doesn't currently have any development hardware to test this theory out on. 
In summary, the main problem with this strategy is the potential waste of resources 
attempting to 'cover the bases' when only one or two of the systems will really pay off. As 
Radical does not have a large cash reserve, this could be very risky. 
4.2.3 Diversify 
This option proposes exploiting new markets, platforms and genres including online, 
wireless and episodic games. 
In terms of new markets, this strategy means a departure from Radical's established game 
formats into new formats better suited to females and casual garners. The Simpsons and CSI 
franchises would seem to be a good crossover vehicle for exploring new demographics as they 
have mass market TP and feature an exploration theme instead of violence. 
In terms of platform support, following this option means pulling some resources away 
from the big 75% console market to pursue the smaller markets. Barriers to entry are low in the 
non-console space so there will be many other developers to compete against. Revenue per game 
is smaller than with consoles and installed base varies. Radical has no competency in these areas. 
Maintaining an online game has further requirements for staff and resources. Episodic games are 
a possibility and if coupled with online distribution could provide a whole new revenue stream. 
This option is high-risk if done by itself, so it should likely be used as a secondary strategy. 
4.2.4 Reposition 
This option proposes becoming a publisher (digital distribution) to own more of the value 
chain. Radical does not have the financial resources to enter the traditional game publishing 
market. However, they do have the opportunity to enter the digital distribution channel as a 
publisher. In theory this would allow them to bypass the retail channel and retain more of the 
value chain for themselves. There are problems with this strategy as digital distribution is still in 
the early stages, so retail is still by far the main way to get a game distributed. As Radical does 
not fund its own development, they do not own the finished games and would have to gain the 
approval of their existing publisher before embarking on this strategy. It should be noted that the 
recent success of Valve's digital distribution method for Half-life 2 (the most anticipated PC 
game of all time), and success in excluding their publisher from any but the retail rights to the 
game may well be the 'killer app' that brings digital distribution into the mainstream. 
Radical might want to take steps in this direction by establishing a separate brand and 
producing small cheap games from their profits or banked cash. Bioware is doing this with its 
new online web store where it sells polished versions of fan-created levels for Neverwinter 
Nights. 
Radical has also expressed concern over their dependence on outside IP for game content. 
If they were to develop and own their own IP, this problem would be solved and they would no 
longer have to pay license fees. The problem with this strategy is the low success rate for new IP 
coupled with the large marketing budget required to bring the IP to the mass market. Radical 
would likely have to use their publisher's resources to accomplish this, which would mean loss of 
ownership over the final property. An alternative strategy is to 'grow' the IP in small steps until 
it is successful enough to attract a publisher's interest: one way to do this would be to include 
small mini-games bundled on the same disc as the full retail game. These mini-games would be 
free to the user, providing a value-add to the game, and would expose the market to the new IF'. 
Once the IP became popular with the market, a full-sized game could be built around it. 
It should be noted that Radical entered the publishing arena once before only to have the 
deal collapse at the last minute. The effect of this loss nearly destroyed the company and has 
made Radical averse to trying this strategy again. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 The current plan 
Radical is currently planning to follow a hybrid strategy by supporting the existing 
consoles for at least two more years while simultaneously beginning support for the new 
consoles. Their strategy for the new consoles is twofold: First, to secure an IP license that will 
guarantee the two million plus unit sales they need to achieve, and second to reduce development 
costs through increased asset sharing and better utilisation of their development staff. This will 
involve moving programmers and artists from team to team in conjunction with the development 
cycle in order to maximize their productivity. In contrast, their current method is to keep 
programmers and artists together on a single team throughout an entire development cycle. 
Radical is also considering some support for the DS and PSP handheld systems to help with the 
transition period. These will likely be ports of existing titles. 
5.1.1 Challenges 
The biggest difficulty with this plan is a lack of development staff. Radical is proposing 
to move from supporting three primary platforms to seven or eight in total. To do this without 
compromising their existing product line will require doubling their staff size in less than a year 
with all of the recruiting and management challenges that entails. Switching some teams over to 
next generation development will also place their revenue stream at risk. Both the handheld 
devices and next generation consoles will require a new tool chain and new pipelines, something 
their internal tools group may not be large enough to handle. Radical may choose to port existing 
titles as a temporary strategy, but they will be competing against a number of original titles 
produced by other companies as launch offerings. 
5.2 Recommendation 
This paper recommends that Radical adopt one primary and one secondary strategy. This 
recommendation is based on mitigating the company's short-term risk while providing the 
potential for a long term payoff. The primary strategy is one of risk mitigation: Radical should 
follow a combination of the status quo and hybrid strategies presented in the previous sections. 
They should continue to develop any Playstation 2 and Xbox games currently in their pipeline 
(status quo). At the same time, they should shift one team over to next generation development 
immediately, even though it may already be too late to make the launch date of the new systems. 
To avoid impacting their revenue stream, the team to do this will be the tools group, focusing on 
building the infrastructure for the new systems. After nearly 5 years work on the existing 
consoles, it is assumed that Radical's current generation pipeline does not require further 
upgrades. Once the groundwork is finished, they should port one of their existing current 
generation titles to the next generation console, using staff from a development team in a 
production lull (hybrid strategy). This strategy will allow Radical to protect its revenue stream to 
develop next generation competences and to produce a launch title for the new consoles. 
The best-case outcome for the primary strategy is to preserve Radical's current position 
in the industry. This is not particularly attractive since Radical will essentially be stuck treading 
water for another generation. The secondary strategy is designed to produce the possibility of a 
large payoff for relatively low risk. This is a strategy of diversification. Radical needs two things 
to improve its position: Freedom from the publishers and ownership over IP. To accomplish 
both of these things, Radical should start a second brand dedicated to the creation and distribution 
of internally owned IP. The initial IP can be any character, story or game world their designers 
can envision. It will grow and evolve in response to the market. To keep costs low, Radical 
should create either mini-games or episodic content with their existing tools. Art can be 
outsourced for greater savings. For exposure, they should bundle these games on the same discs 
as their best selling products. And for distribution without a publisher, they should start of 
partner with a digital distribution channel. The cost of this strategy is low. The potential payoff 
is large once the IP has successfully incubated and achieved mass-market appeal. At that time, 
Radical will be in a favourable position to negotiate with publishers for a full sized game from the 
IP. This is the start of a positive feedback loop; once the brand achieves its first success, it can 
then be leveraged to restart the IP cycle. 
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